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ABSTRACT
In the era of  globalization we  in a world of  overlapping territories 
and strangers are now always proximate, her or his otherness can 
no longer be denied. Present-day modernity is characterized by 
uncertainty; reason and knowledge-based science are questioned. 
There is a need for a revaluation of  culture, civilization, individual 
and group identity. This also calls for a moral reassessment of  
society and the nation-state. 
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ultures and civilizations are as old as human history, however, the Clast two decades or so culture and civilization as concepts have been 
extensively discussed and questioned in all corners of  the (academic) world. 
Politicians, journalists, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, 
economists, philosophers and lay people have crowded this Babylon with 
virulent energy.
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The fall of  the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 aroused enormous 
euphoria and not only in that particular part of  Europe. In this post-Cold 
War excitement some thought that the West provides the only model to 
modernization. Other parts of  the world should follow the social, political 
and economic models that have brought prosperity to the West. And these 
models focus on free market capitalism; science, technology and innovation; 
meritocracy through the market based on equal opportunities and access to 
education; pragmatism in politics; democracy and peaceful negotiations; and 
the rule of  law. Pragmatism in politics supposedly leads to an absence of  
ideological conflict and Francis Fukuyama concluded that history came to an 
1
end (history is then defined as ideological conflict in a Hegelian fashion).  
This overlooks the diversity all around our world and it is clear by now that 
not all countries are 'progressing' towards Western liberal democracy nor are 
they willing to do so in the future (the term 'progress' implies that people 
should only be satisfied if  they live in a country like Western countries).
The end of  the Cold War, though, posed many new questions. A bi-polar 
world was rather easy to understand after more than forty years of  phony war 
between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Samuel Huntington 
designed a multi-polar world order: the clash of  civilizations. “People use 
2
politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity.”  
And international politics, according to Huntington, is characterized by 
identity politics in the era after the Cold War. To define the West, though, as 
Christian overlooks the fact that the United States are very different from the 
European Union countries (almost five hundred million citizens) due the 
secularization in many European countries. Moreover, it overlooks the fact 
that while many Asian countries are predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, 
Confucianist or Islamic, there are also many Christians living in these 
countries (it also remains a question, for example, how much significant 
impact Confucianism has on communist China or that only lip service is paid 
to its tenets).
The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of  11 September 
2001 ended the joyous nineties. Some see a new bi-polar world emerging: 
Islam versus the rest, particularly the West. To cope with anxiety induced by 
terror, non-Muslims started to read the Quran. However, not civilizations 
can clash, persons can, and a person is never only a Muslim, nor is one 
Muslim a representation of  Islam as such. By seeing an individual person 
merely through the perspective of  community, culture, religion or 
civilization, is to reduce that person to a single dimension. Well before 
civilizations can clash, we have already limited the scope to a single 
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perspective. Then we fall in the trap of  stereotypes – sometimes with good 
intention. That all Muslims are (potential) terrorists is as much nonsense as 
claiming that all Muslims are by definition peace lovers. Amartya Sen says 
that we have “to distinguish between (1) the various affiliations and loyalties a 
person who happens to be a Muslim has, and (2) his or her Islamic identity in 
3
particular.”  We will miss the whole picture if  we only focus on the second. 
To read war through the prism of  religion is to overlook other reasons and 
causes. For example, the Middle East cannot be understood if  we only look 
at Islam and Judaism; the conflict also concerns access to land and drinkable 
water (after all, most of  this area is desert).
The cheerful nineties became even farther away when the bank Lehman 
Brothers went bankrupt on 15 September 2008 and this bankruptcy ignited a 
global financial crisis. This financial crisis is also a political crisis, because 
global market capitalism could only be established through political 
decisions. Now questions are raised whether the United States can still 
remain the sole super power in the world of  emerging powers. And not so 
much the power of  the United States is declining as that other powers are 
emerging, for example: China (a country that borrowed huge amounts to the 
United States, partly to pay for the war-on-terror), India and Brazil have to be 
4
reckoned with today and in the future.  These historical changes in society, 
politics and the economy raise many new philosophical questions. How to 
understand identity, culture and civilization in our globalized world 
(especially from an Asian perspective)?
Globalization is not something abstract, it is concrete (and its 
consequences are real). Globalization is not out there, it is here (and now). 
Globalization is not metaphysical, it is political (because its consequences are 
real and public). While the consequences of  globalization are obviously 
uneven, that, on the other hand, does not mean that people have merely to 
accept these consequences passively without any ability to alter, appropriate 
and acculturate. Fatalism, after all, is the end of  power to change.
There is nothing teleological about globalization. History has no purpose 
and the future is not inevitable. We are not progressing toward a situation 
where we will all be members of  a single civilization, where all peoples of  the 
world will embrace liberal-secular democracy and free market capitalism as 
the end of  ideological conflict. Not only is globalization not a given, its 
consequences are unequal and not benign (and can be bellicose).
Modernity in the era of  globalization is not linear and not singular. The 
Enlightenment hope for progress and historical inevitability is utopian. 
Moreover, the Enlightenment dream of  a universal civilization is 
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5Eurocentric.  A growing interconnectedness and interdependence does not 
necessarily lead to peaceful cooperation; globalization does not mean an end 
to all international political conflicts, interstate war remains an immanent 
possibility. While nation-states might seem to have lost steam, it does not 
mean an end to state sovereignty. Globalization has impacts on everyone, but 
not equally. Globalization, writes Ulrich Beck, are “the processes through 
which sovereign national states are criss-crossed and undermined by 
transnational actors with varying prospects of  power, orientation, identities 
6
and networks.”  Globalization, Anthony Giddens writes, is a “[g]rowing 
interdependence between different peoples, regions and countries in the 
7
world as social and economic relationships come to stretch worldwide.”  
Giddens sees modernity spreading across the globe as globalization 
8
progresses.  Modernization in the era of  globalization is not the same as 
Westernization or homogenization (hybridization is the keyword). 
9
Modernization becomes pluralized;  globalization thus means a move away 
10
from universalism.  
Space and time are being compressed; we can go across space within no 
time. Activities – from war to entertainment – can occur or experienced 
simultaneously around the globe. This does not mean that space is no longer 
of  significance, how could we be and act without it? Space is the 
precondition to all existence, action and interaction. We, to state the obvious, 
live spatially. Territory is still important and we can see a dialectic between the 
local and the global, i.e. glocalization. Globalization is thus still spatially 
constituted, however, the meaning of  distance and proximity changes in a 
world where people, values and goods are mobile. I can be socially near to 
someone, but that person can be spatially distant (or the other way around).
Globalization is not a one-way process people have to undergo passively, 
but, of  course, not every one has the same power to alter, appropriate and 
acculturate these changes. We are connected in many ways, and economics is 
only one way. Globalization should not be seen as something 'out there', it is 
also an 'in here' matter. Globalization “affects, or rather is dialectically related 
11
to, even the most intimate aspects of  our lives.”  Globalization restructures 
space, what Giddens calls 'action at distance' is the possibility to act without 
being present. 'Action at distance' is a two-way process, globalization is 
without 'direction' and we can no longer speak of  globalization as 
Westernization. No one is outside, and while for a long time, the 
'conversation' went only from the West to the 'other' now “mutual 
12
interrogation is possible.”  With 'mutual interrogation' (for example the 
ongoing debate on post-colonialism and neo-imperialism) not only come all 
34
MELINTAS 25.1.2009
sorts of  forms of  (violent) resistance, but also possibilities for all sides to 
change.
One such interrogation to resist is the three-decade-old book Orientalism 
by the Palestinian-American Edward Said. The illegitimate invasion of  Iraq 
by the United States – by ignoring the United Nations and the territorial 
integrity of  the people of  Iraq (as a consequence the United States have lost 
standing in the international community and therefore (soft) power to get 
things done) – makes that this book did not loose any of  its persuasive power.
What Said calls Orientalism is an Orient based on the experiences of  
Westerners. Orientalism is a discourse to make a dividing line between 'us' 
and 'them', between those who are included in the making of  history and 
civilization and those who are not. For this Said borrows from Michel 
Foucault and Antonio Gramsci. From Foucault he borrows the term 
discourse and from Gramsci the term hegemony. Orientalism is an academic, 
intellectual and cultural discourse that helps to sustain the economic, political 
and military hegemony of  among others the United States.
According to Said, borrowing from Giovanni Battista Vico, “the Orient 
is not an inert fact of  nature. It is not merely there, just as the Occident itself  is 
not just there either. […M]en make their own history, that what they can know 
is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and 
cultural entities – to say nothing of  historical entities [such as nation-states] – 
such locales, regions, geographical sectors as 'Orient' and 'Occident' are man-
13
made.”  However, Said continues, these ideas on space have real 
consequences for power relations in our global society.
Through Orientalism the Orient becomes 'Orientalized', so that the 
Occident can dominate the Orient. Orientalism is not merely a set of  myths 
that can be removed by revealing the truth. Orientalism is a hegemonic 
discourse about the Orient to hold power over the Orient. “Orientalism 
depends for its strategy on this flexible positional superiority, which puts the 
Westerner in a whole series of  possible relationships with the Orient without 
14
ever losing him the relative upper hand.”
Said is not saying that only women can write about women (men can be 
feminists, John Stuart Mill and Amartya Sen are examples), or only 
homosexuals about homosexuals, blacks about blacks, Asians about Asians, 
Muslims about Islam. Said writes that “there is a difference between 
knowledge of  other peoples and other times that is the result of  
understanding, compassion, careful study and analysis for their own sakes 
[Said calls this form of  knowledge humanism], and on the other hand 
knowledge – if  that is what it is – that is part of  an overall campaign of  self-
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affirmation, belligerency, and out-right war. There is, after all, a profound 
difference between the will to understand for purposes of  coexistence and 
humanistic enlargement of  horizons, and the will to dominate for the 
purposes of  control and external enlargement of  horizons, and the will to 
15
dominate for the purposes of  control and external domination.”
Said's book Orientalism is about how Westerners perceive the Orient and 
how this body of  knowledge is used in a power structure. His book is not 
about the Orient in general or about the Arab and Islamic world in particular. 
This book is also not an anti-Western book. In the Islamic world, so says 
Said, this book is read as such. Said calls this 'Occidentosis', which means that 
16
Muslims claim that “all the evils in the world come from the west.”
The Dutch-British Ian Buruma and the Israeli Avishai Margalit wrote a 
book about 'Occidentosis'. They write in the conclusion of  Occidentalism, The 
West in the Eyes of  its Enemies: “The story we have told in this book is not a 
Manichaeistic one of  a civilization at war with another. On the contrary, it is a 
tale of  cross-contamination, the spread of  bad ideas. This could happen to 
us now, if  we fall for the temptation to fight fire with fire, Islamism with our 
own forms of  intolerance. […] We cannot afford to close our societies as a 
defense against those who have closed theirs. For then we would all become 
17
Occidentalists, and there would be nothing left to defend.”  Shortly after the 
9/11 attacks, George W. Bush inaugurated the war-on-terror by saying that 
who is not with him is against him. Bush as the commander-in-chief  of  this 
war only caused more enemies (Friedrich Nietzsche could have warned 
18
him).
Orientalism by Edward Said and Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit's 
Occidentalism, are about those people who divide the world in an 'us' and a 
'them', who see the other as different, unlike 'us', less than human, i.e. these 
are dehumanizing ideologies, which reduces human individuals to sub-
human classes, which, in turn, can lead to the destruction of  human lives.
The Orientalist sees the other as the 'lazy native', as the 'exotic savant' 
(often pictured in erotic and feminized terms). The native is backward 
because of  his irrationality, and this justifies colonialism and imperialism. 
Colonialism and imperialism are justified as civilizational forces, so the 
argument goes.
Orientalism is as one-dimensional as Occidentalism, but now it 
dehumanizes not the peoples of  the Orient but the peoples of  the Occident. 
Both ideologies have real and violent consequences. Buruma and Margalit's 
book is an attempt to understand those who hijacked airplanes that 
destroyed the WTC in New York on an early September morning that reset 
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the mood for this new millennium.
It is the spiritual and profound East versus the coldly mechanical, 
shallow, rootless, destructive, sex-obsessed, and materialistic West. Today, 
Occidentalists often focus at the United States, however, “anti-Americanism 
is sometimes the result of  specific American policies […]. But whatever the 
U.S. government does or does not do is often beside the point. [… 
Occidentalism refers] not to American policies, but to the idea of  America 
itself, as a rootless, cosmopolitan, superficial, trivial, materialistic, racially-
19
mixed, fashion-addicted civilization.”
How to deal with contingency, disagreement, indeterminacy, 
inconsistency, incoherence, incongruity, ambivalence, heterogeneity, opacity, 
paradoxy, risk and uncertainty in our globalized era? Friedrich Nietzsche is 
the philosopher that warned us that ontological uncertainty causes anxiety, 
20
and possibly violence against the 'stranger', against what is 'alien'.  
According to Zygmunt Bauman the task of  philosophy today is to teach us 
how to deal with uncertainty and contingency. No matter how much we need 
common ground, the search for absolute and universal values, though, is the 
21
existential need for security.  In a traditional society the stranger would live 
on the other side of  a mountain or sea (the Greeks called those strangers 
barbarians), today we no longer have that luxury.
Some long back to a traditional society, for it gives ontological security a 
society in present-day modernity cannot provide, with all the anxiety 
consequently. In a pre-modern society the question what a society is remains 
unasked. Within a tradition a person lives in a pre-established order. In 
present-day modernity the individual has to ask the questions how (global) 
society should be ordered. We can no longer rely on pre-established answers 
for these questions.
Modernity held the promise that we could find security in rationality. 
However, modernity is now primarily characterized by insecurity and 
instability. Radical doubt is turned against itself: how could radical doubt lead 
to certain and stable knowledge with which we could colonize the future? 
The amount we do not – or: cannot – know is probably as large as what we do 
know now. Many dangers we face in this world are manufactured by 
ourselves (for example: global warming or the economic crises of  1997 and 
2008). Many things cannot be given, that makes calculating the probable 
consequences of  risks impossible.
We can know how to act if  we are able to understand a situation. 
Indeterminacy makes global society a risk-prone environment. The more 
complex society is – i.e. the complexity of  the network of  interactions – the 
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more insecure and instable. A high-risk environment can lead to anxiety and 
alienation. We live in an ambivalent territory, as Bauman writes: “life is 
22
carried on by strangers among strangers.”  How to decide how to act if  
actions of  others are unpredictable (because who the other is, is unknown)? 
This can make life fragmentary. Bauman states that there is a gap between 
what we need to know how to act and what we can know how to act among 
people we perceive as 'strange'. Civilization and the freedom to sustain and 
create cultural values are no longer feasible when fear takes over (see for 
example the European Union captured in the image of  a fortress).
The individual has to negotiate the proximity of  differences. The 
stranger is near but socially distant. The high mobility in present-day 
modernity makes this situation even more complex. The danger is a renewed 
longing for communityhood – a community of  thick relations of  care – to 
exclude the stranger.
That brings us to the moral problem of  cultural relativism. There is an 
old saying: “In Rome behave as the Romans do.” Does that mean there is no 
room for universal values that cross the boundaries of  space and time? One 
such universal value could be the respect for human life. However, the 
debates concerning abortion, euthanasia and the death penalty seem to show 
that we do not have a consensus on the question what constitutes man. What 
is then the normative source of  morality if  our moral values and norms 
merely reflect the cultural conventions of  a particular space and time?
The anthropologist Clifford Geertz defines culture as “an historically 
transmitted pattern of  meanings embodied in symbols, a system of  inherited 
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of  which men 
communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes 
23
toward life.”  Geertz is thus a relativist. And indeed, different cultures do 
have different values and norms. What can be considered as right in one 
culture can be perceived as wrong in another, and it is then naïve to assume 
that our norms have universal validity.
Cultural relativists assume that there are no universal truths in ethics, i.e. 
that every normative standard can only be applied within a culture. Cultural 
relativists conclude from the fact that there are cultural differences that we 
also cannot find any agreement on morality. Rachels calls this the 'cultural 
difference argument'. “The premise concerns what people believe […]. The 
24
conclusion, however, concerns what really is the case.”  This argument is 
therefore logically fallacious. As if  the simple point that we disagree means 
that no true position can be found (for example, for a long time most were 
convinced that the earth was flat and the center of  the universe). Cultural 
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relativism overestimates our differences.
But what if  we would take cultural relativism seriously? What are the 
consequences if  we do not have a normative point of  view from outside a 
certain culture? The first consequence is that we can no longer perceive 
cultural practices as morally inferior to our own practices, i.e. we have no 
longer a tool for moral criticism (in the debates on human rights and Asian 
values this position is often taken, criticism is then not seen as enlightened 
but as a new tool of  imperialism). Second, we can only judge our society by 
the standards of  our own society. So even when we know that our society is 
not perfect, we have no tools to morally improve it. And third, moral 
relativism not only makes criticism impossible, it also makes moral progress 
infeasible. Relativism does not give us a standard to judge something as being 
better or improved, that makes social reform impossible.
Many of  our values are indeed products of  our cultural conventions and 
it is mere arrogance to assume that our moral values are based on an absolute 
rational standard and therefore ultimately better than other moral systems. 
We should be wary of  prejudices. Cultural relativism criticizes the 
dogmatism of  universalism. However, cultural relativists go a step further, a 
step that leads back to universal morality. Anti-dogmatism, so claim 
relativists, could lead to the virtues of  tolerance and respectfulness; these are, 
though, moral values, which can according to relativism not be independent 
from culture.
Multiculturalism, the theory that is connected to cultural relativism, has 
two major flaws (beside the ones discussed above). First, just as the world 
cannot be divided into homogenous civilizations, so can a society not be 
divided into homogenous blocks of  separate cultures. Global society is one 
of  overlapping territories and interdependent histories, according to Said. 
And second, multiculturalism locks individuals up in separate cultures by 
reducing their identity to a singular identity. 
Amartya Sen wants to make clear in his latest book Identity and Violence 
that nations are not diverse because they are federations of  peoples, each 
nation, on the other hand, is a collection of  individual citizens and each 
individual inhibits a wide range of  identities. It depends on the context, 
according to Sen, which part of  our identity gets focus. No matter how 
constraint we are by circumstances, we still have to choose and for making 
choices we need to reason, i.e. to give arguments and justifications.
Identity is a complicated matter. And identity matters. Identity matters 
for the way we are, think and act. “When we shift our attention from the 
notion of  being identical to oneself to that of  sharing an identity with others of  a 
39
Roy Voragen: Overlapping Territories
25
particular group […], the complexity increases further.”  Huntington is right 
to claim that there are differences between the East and the West, but he 
makes those differences too pronounced, there exists considerable overlap. 
“Civilizational or religious partitioning of  the world population yields a 
26
'solitarist' approach to human identity.”
We all have plural identities according to Sen and he claims that it 
depends on a particular context which part gets importance. “When the 
prospects of  good relations among different human beings are seen […] 
primarily in terms of  'amity among civilizations', or 'dialogue between 
religious groups', or 'friendly relations between different communities' […], 
a serious miniaturization of  human beings precedes the devised programs of  
27
peace.”
Society is a 'collection' of  strangers; acknowledging this fact is an 
important step to the cosmopolitanization of  society. Cosmopolitanization 
entails pluralization and hybridization instead of  homogenization. The 
wider world becomes a part of  society. Resisting ambiguity can lead to 
violence: “someone who affirms and elevates 'his own' will almost inevitably 
28
rejects and despises the foreign.” Prejudices are reflections of  fear.
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